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Tax is traditionally viewed as the main funding mechanism for government spending.
Consequently, social policy is often seen as something determined and constrained by tax
revenue. Modern Monetary Theory (‘MMT’) presents a reversal of the tax-spend cycle, by
identifying a spend-tax cycle. Using the UK as an example, we highlight that one of MMT’s
most important, but under-explored, contributions is its potential to re-frame the role of tax
from both a macroeconomic and social policy perspective. We use insights on the money
removal, or cancellation function of taxes, derived from MMT, to demonstrate how this
also creates possibilities for using tax to achieve social objectives such as mitigating
income and wealth inequality, increasing access to housing, or funding a Green New
Deal. For social policy researchers the challenge arising is to use these insights to
re-engineer tax systems and redesign social tax expenditures (STEs) for creative social
policy purposes.
Keywords: Tax, modern monetary theory, social policy, modern tax theory, money, debt,
government.
I n t roduc t ion
The role of tax in society is complex. As the Mirrlees Review (IFS, 2011: 2) noted,
reiterating an observation made by Schumpeter over a hundred years ago (Schumpeter,
1991 [1918]), tax systems have to suit the societies that create them. Nevertheless, the
Mirrlees Review viewed tax policy choices largely through a utilitarian revenue-raising
lens. It presented taxes and government spending as separate issues, rather than as a single
system for government intervention in an economy (Kay, 1986). Drawing on insights from
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) we outline a spend-tax cycle that reverses the relation-
ship commonly assumed to exist in a tax-spend cycle, and explore the implications of this
reversal for using tax as an instrument of social policy. This alternative framing has
considerable appeal for understanding and designing taxes from a social policy
perspective.
Awareness of tax and tax expenditures as social instruments in their own right does
have some history (Surrey, 1974) but this is not how tax is commonly perceived. Tax as
social policy is often ‘hidden’ to disassociate it from welfare hand-outs (Howard, 1997) or
to conceal how it favours high-income groups. The distributional effects of tax policy
choices and instruments have certainly been investigated by social policy scholars
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(Sinfield, 2000; Ferrarini and Nelson, 2003; Avram, 2018). Efforts to understand the social
and political processes present in taxation and their social and political consequence have
also been undertaken under the umbrella of the ‘new fiscal sociology’ (Barker, 1992;
Martin et al., 2009; Schumpeter, 1991 [1918]: 101). Other research has explored the
strategies through which actors on the left and the right seek to build social movements to
change taxation policy (Martin, 2015; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015). Nevertheless, efforts
to conceptualise the role and function of tax in society, including the possibilities arising
from this by drawing on macroeconomic rationales and framings remain rare. The
normative choices, agency and possibilities involved in the setting of tax policies have
consequently often been obscured and received too little attention (O’Neill and Orr,
2018). We place consideration of the role of tax in a macroeconomic context, so as to
renew debates about tax as a potential instrument of social policy, while challenging
social policy academics to consider what implications a spend-tax cycle has for how they
conceive of and research the role and contribution of tax in society.
Tax is a component part of a country’s broader macroeconomic policy mix and does,
therefore, have a macroeconomic function. A first step in developing an alternative
conception of the functions and roles of tax within this context requires a sense of why tax
as process involves more than simple utilitarian calculations about how to most effectively
raise revenue to fund government expenditure. An exploration of the claims of MMT
provides the macroeconomic foundations for such an alternative framing (Wray, 2012;
Murphy, 2015b). The first section of this article explores the potential roles and functions
of taxation within the framework of MMT. Second, some opposing views are discussed. A
third section considers the interaction between tax and ‘tax spends’ within the UK,
applying an MMT lens. Finally, the tax reform possibilities that arise from this alternative
understanding are presented in a concluding section.
Overall, our novel and original contribution is a counter-intuitive claim that the most
important practical contribution of MMT lies in its potential to reframe how tax is thought
about with implications for how tax systems can and should be designed. This emerges
through MMT’s account of the process of money creation, the spend-tax cycle that results
and the ‘cancellation’ function performed by tax. Cancellation refers to the fact that just as
bank loan repayment cancels the money created by commercial bank lending, so too does
tax payment cancel the money created by both government spending and private credit
creation. The full implications of this for how tax should be conceived of in academic work
and talked about in public debate as an instrument of social policy have not as yet been fully
articulated. Wemove beyond the existing MMT literature, where both advocates and critics
focus on money creation, government debt and inflation, with relatively little effort being
made by either side to elaborate MMTs claims on tax or to establish their practical policy
implications. For tax to play its cancellation role adequately, MMT scholars will need to
theoretically elaborate a form of Modern Tax Theory (MTT) showing more fully how this
function works, while developing policy tools and frameworks that can assess both the
macroeconomic impact of tax policies and their social policy value, in terms consistent with
MMT priorities (Murphy, 2019). We begin that process here with specific reference to social
policy and encourage other scholars to further develop and apply these insights in future
research.
We also go beyond existing social policy literature, which has identified that social
tax expenditures (STEs), or tax spends (Kay, 1986), represent foregone revenue through
reliefs and credits as a new form of fiscal welfare to recipients (Howard, 1997; Hacker,
Monetary Theory and The Changing Role of Tax
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2002; Morel et al., 2018). These STEs often favour higher income groups by incentivising
savings, private health care, and private education, constituting subtle, yet significant
transformations in welfare states and social citizenship, in a new mode of governing social
policy through fiscal welfare incentives (Morel et al., 2018: 550). Monitoring the costs of
STEs is limited and incomplete (Sinfield, 2012) making them more politically acceptable
than direct expenditures (Morel et al., 2018: 557). Under an MMT framing, conducting
more systematic evaluations of STEs becomes imperative. MMT brings into relief that the
problem with some STEs goes beyond mere lost revenue, to illuminate how they can
interfere with macroeconomic integrity and stability more generally, by undermining tax’s
cancellation function. By highlighting the limited macroeconomic rationale for such
policies, the MMT framing also reveals starkly that the primary impact of using STEs to
prioritise savings and unearned investment income, are their regressive social effects. We
advocate harnessing MMT insights with new tools for assessing tax policies and adminis-
trative practices, including their potential system undermining consequences, such as our
recent tax spillover framework (Baker and Murphy, 2019a), to evaluate the combined
macroeconomic and social implications of STEs on a more systematic basis. Social policy
research needs to be central to such efforts. We provide the first account of what MMT
insights mean for a thoroughgoing tax policy agenda, including how this can inform the
evaluation of STEs. At the same time, we illuminate how systematic evaluations of STEs are
necessary, if MMT is to translate its macroeconomic insights into a meaningful practical
tax policy agenda.
Tax and Modern Mone ta ry Theory (MMT)
In the United States, MMT has recently risen to prominence because of its role in shaping
proposals for a Green New Deal resulting in a series of high-profile media exchanges
between Stephanie Kelton (Kelton, 2019) and Paul Krugman (Krugman, 2019), as well as
Simon Wren-Lewis (Wren-Lewis, 2019) and Bill Mitchell (Mitchell, 2019). Amidst these
often-heated exchanges, MMT’s potential to broaden understandings and reframe public
debate on the role of tax, especially in an era when experimentation with forms of
quantitative easing has been widespread, has been lost. Scepticism about MMT has been
commonplace, even among heterodox economists (Epstein, 2019). Unsurprisingly, as a
result the implications of MMT’s macroeconomic understandings for tax have received
little attention outside the inner MMT sanctum. We show that one of the most practically
useful implications of the increasing prominence of MMT insights in public economic
debate is that it provides a macroeconomic rationale and framing, which can help to
renovate the social policy role of tax.
Expert tax activists have identified six possible roles tax can perform within an
economy (Cobham, 2005; Murphy, 2015a). These are:
1) Reclaiming the money that the government has spent in the economy with the aim of
controlling inflation;
2) Ratifying the value of money by creating demand for currency, through a requirement
that tax is settled using the local currency of a country;
3) Redistributing income and wealth;
4) Repricing market failure, mainly to control externalities through Pigouvian taxes;
5) Reorganising the economy, through the fiscal policy mix;
Andrew Baker and Richard Murphy
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6) Reinforcing democracy, by creating a public desire to influence how income tax is
raised and spent, encouraging and motivating people to vote.
These roles are not without a theoretical foundation, or justification. In what follows
we elaborate more thoroughly what those theoretical foundations and justifications are.
MMT is an approach that has challenged conventional macroeconomic understand-
ings of the relationship between tax and government spending. Using national income
accounting (Godley, 1996) orthodox macroeconomic thinking assumes that government
spending (characterised as G) is funded by tax revenue raised (T), with any deficit or
shortfall being funded by borrowing (B). In this formulation it is frequently suggested that G
should equal T, with political opprobrium reserved for excess borrowing (HM Treasury,
2017b: 4). These are powerful basic beliefs that have contributed to constrained social
spending throughout Europe in an age of austerity after the financial crisis with deleterious
social consequences (Taylor-Gooby, 2012; Blyth, 2013; Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014;
Dowler and Lambie-Mumford, 2015; Edmiston, 2014). Concerns over reduced tax
revenues have fed into reduced GDP spending on health and social security in the UK
for example (IFS, 2019: 5).
MMT challenges the propositions behind this logic and crucially reverses the
sequencing underpinning it (Wray, 2012). In the classic MMT formulation, a government
with its own currency and central bank spends before it taxes, bringing the money through
which taxes are paid into existence (Mitchell et al., 2019: 124). Government spending on
the basis of available central bank credit, is, as with all money creation, a process that does
not require the existence of prior deposits in a bank (McLeay et al., 2014) or, in the case of
a government, revenue raised in advance by taxation. If a government insists on taxes
being paid in sovereign currency, that currency must, in the MMT view, first be created to
enable those taxes to be paid (Wray, 2012: 471).
In the MMT understanding, this ‘spend and tax cycle,’ as opposed to a ‘tax and spend
cycle’ has three primary implications. First, tax gives a currency its value (Mitchell et al.,
2019: 137). A government accepting its own currency in the settlement of tax creates
demand for the currency it issues and gives meaning to the promise to pay printed on bank
notes as the foundation of modern money. Second, the requirement that tax be paid using
this currency usually requires that the currency in question be used as a medium for
exchange within the economy (Murphy, 2015a: 642). Third, the raw mechanics of
government spending when a national sovereign currency and national central bank
exist, involves crediting the accounts of actors in receipt of that government spending. Tax
revenue is consequently not prior, but subsequent to spending.
The account presented in the sequence above is a central tenet of MMT. It is
underpinned by a reality in which all money, excluding notes and coins, is created by
bank lending, as has been acknowledged by the Bank of England (McLeay et al., 2014).
MMT applies this understanding to the distinct relationship between a government and its
central bank. It argues first that a government, unlike a household (or a commercial bank)
creates the currency being used in a jurisdiction, and declares it sovereign. Second,
whereas households and banks are constrained by their income and the funds required for
solvency, governments can through their central banks issue currency and create money.
Third, according to MMT therefore, G need not equal T, because money can be created at
will to settle government debt by the government issuing instruction to the central bank to
make settlement3.
Monetary Theory and The Changing Role of Tax
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The formulation below can be seen as an interpretation of orthodox economics which
posits that the basic national income functions relating to tax are as follows:
G ¼ Tþ ΔB
where ΔB is the change in government borrowing in a year.
MMT expresses this function as (Mitchell et al., 2019):
G ¼ Tþ ΔBþ ΔM
where ΔM is the change in the quantity of government money created in a period.
Government created money (M) can in this context simply refer to an overdraft it runs
at its central bank. However, given that these are generally illegal (Jácome et al., 2012) in
the contemporary era such practices have taken the form of quantitative easing, where the
government instructs the central bank to purchase assets including government debt. In
the UK this has led to the government effectively owning (via the Bank of England) £435
billion of its own debt, which withdraws it from effective circulation as a result and
cancels all interest costs upon it. The Bank of England describes this as ‘newmoney’ (Bank
of England, 2019), confirming it is ‘M’.
Just as in the current Bank of England explanation of money creation where loan
repayment withdraws money from circulation and effectively cancels it (McLeay et al.,
2014), so too does the payment of tax contribute to the cancellation of the debt that a
government creates in the system when it spends in the MMT explanation of the
government revenue cycle. This cancellation process means that tax acts to reduce
spending capacity in an economy (money withdrawal), simultaneously restraining
demand (Fullwiler et al., 2019) and contributing to price stability (Mitchell et al., 2019:
323). Freed from a fixation with the revenue raising efficiency of individual tax measures,
the MMT position casts tax in a more overt and active countercyclical macroeconomic
stabilisation role. As wewill show through consideration of the UK case, this also potentially
allows this cancellation role to be combined with the use of tax to promote social policy
objectives considered desirable by society and policy makers alike.
In the existing MMT literature, however, accounts of the potential social policy role of
tax remain thin, focusing almost entirely on the so-called ‘jobs guarantee,’ with full
employment the primary MMT policy objective (Wray et al., 2018). MMT effectively
contains more far reaching intellectual justification for evaluating so called STEs, but
developing a form of MMT derived modern tax theory (MTT), would assist in this
endeavour (Murphy, 2019).
Critics have argued that MMT overestimates the tax rates that the public are willing to
tolerate (Palley, 2015). U.S. Conservative Bruce Bartlett (Bartlett, 2019) suggests that MMT
is a kind of Laffer Curve for the Left, permitting spurious magical thinking to justify
increased public spending without considering inflationary consequences. MMT econ-
omists use the logic of sectoral accounting balances to assert the non-inflationary nature of
their case, but their relative lack of engagement with inflation as an expectations driven
social phenomenon, rather than as a mathematical proposition, is a potential Achilles’
heel. Nevertheless, the implications of MMT insights on the sequences of the spend-tax
cycle, where tax is not confined to revenue-raising and tax revenue is not prior to
government spending, are worthy of further exploration.
Andrew Baker and Richard Murphy
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Our focus here is on the sequential insight that governments do not first need access to
tax revenues to spend. This enables tax policies to be more fully viewed and understood in
terms of a broader range of macroeconomic and societal functions. The implication of
such an observation is as much political and discursive, in terms of widening public
debates, political narratives and shifting mind-sets, as it is economic and technical. It also
has potential consequences for the research agendas of social scientists focused on tax.
Tax policy decisions become less about their utilitarian revenue raising merits and more
about their wider macroeconomic effects – as well as the extent to which they enable
governments and societies to realise objectives and priorities that the democratic process
and societal deliberation deem important – or their social purpose and the kind of
economic system and social settlement to which they contribute (Baker, 2018).
One example, of the kind of mind-set shift these MMT derived observations facilitate
is provided by corporation tax. In the UK, public debate focuses on the appropriate level of
corporation tax to most efficiently raise revenue (IFS, 2017; Jackson and Houlder, 2017).
But this is a limited way of assessing the merits of particular policies. While corporation tax
can be an important revenue raising device, especially in developing countries, the
reasons for its original introduction go far beyond revenue raising capacity. Corporation
and capital gains taxes have a long-standing defensive rationale. That is they reinforce and
buttress other direct taxes such as income tax, or social security, maintaining the integrity
and functioning of tax systems as integrated entities. Without these taxes, it becomes
easier for individuals to present income as a capital gains, or to transfer it to a company
structure, leaving it untaxed.
Such rationales were cited in the legislative debates surrounding the introduction of
corporation tax bills in both the United Kingdom and the United States (Bank, 2001; Baker
and Murphy, 2019a: 182). Once we begin to think in terms of a buttressing function for
corporate taxes limiting potential leakages in tax systems and holding them together as
entire entities, evaluations of corporate taxation can shift from a focus on revenue raising
efficiency, to assessments of whether they fulfil their original intended purpose of
reinforcing a tax system as a whole (Baker and Murphy, 2019a). Likewise, the ‘regulatory
rationale’ for corporate tax proposed by legal scholars sees corporation tax as a mecha-
nism for increasing the accountability and regulating the activities of corporate managers
(Avi-Yonah, 2004). Tax in this interpretation is about shaping economic activity and social
relations. It fulfils a social purpose distinct from revenue raising. It also means a range of
tax practices, policies and reliefs need to be evaluated to assess whether corporate taxes
fulfil this function (Baker and Murphy, 2019a).
In public debate and to a lesser degree scholarship, these questions of designing and
assessing taxes to fulfil a broader social purpose, remain marginalised and obscured by the
fixation on tax as a revenue raising device. MMT provides intellectual foundations to help
overcome that fixation.
Cr i t i c i sm of the MMT approach
Some criticisms of MMT positions have already been noted. Among the most relevant is
that using taxes for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes is difficult in practice: taxes are
hard to change at short notice (Krugman, 2019). Likewise, it has been suggested
governments are reluctant to increase taxes due to electoral pressures (Epstein, 2019).
In this reading MMT may underestimate the political economy constraints on using tax for
Monetary Theory and The Changing Role of Tax
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macroeconomic stabilisation. However, a sustained period in which interest rates have
been at, or close to the zero lower bound also increases pressures for tax to play such a
role. Nor do these objections detract from the fact that some STEs can have destabilising
macroeconomic effects.
In the UK, the work of Jonathan Portes (Portes, 2019) and Simon Wren-Lewis (Wren-
Lewis, 2018) has shaped the Labour Party’s Fiscal Credibility Rule (Labour Party, 2017).
This is intended to provide reassurance to voters that day-to-day spending will be
balanced and borrowing will only be used to fund investment (Ahmed, 2016). In essence,
the assumption that tax is needed to fund government spending (T=G) is respected, with
some allowances for minimal levels of government debt. Both authors have defended their
positions and rejected MMT criticisms of their approach, by citing the need for indepen-
dent authorities and rules that tie a government’s hands, as a means of providing
reassurance to voters that government debt will not be excessive. This reflects the most
prominent critique of MMT that it places too much faith in governments to exercise
restraint (Epstein, 2019) and ignores ‘political economy difficulties’ where politicians are
tempted to use monetary policy for electoral purposes (Palley, 2015).
Such critiques have largely been aimed at questioning the political and policy realism
of adopting MMT policy prescriptions, such as those proposed by American Congress-
woman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Ocasio-Cortez, 2019) in a US version of the Green
New Deal based on green infrastructure quantitative easing (Murphy and Hines, 2010;
Green New Deal Group, 2013; Murphy, 2015b). The stakes are certainly high in terms of
the potential of MMT to achieve public policy objectives. But, given their focus, these
critiques have largely overlooked the implications of the sequences of an MMT spend-tax
cycle. In this sense, the reservations they raise should not preclude efforts to consider more
thoroughly the implications of MMT insights for tax.
MMT, tax a l l owances and re l i e f s and the imp l i ca t ions fo r UK tax po l i cy
In this section we examine how an MMT perspective can help to illuminate distortions
within the UK tax system and point a pathway to reform. The governance of the UK tax
system and the debates around it, as we have seen, focus largely on revenue raising.
Table 1 shows forecast revenues for the tax years 2018/19 and 2019/20.
What is not made clear in the official data, such as that in Table 1, is that the stated
figures are net of tax reliefs and allowances. There are thought to be more than 1,000 of
these allowances (National Audit Office, 2014), the cost of which are estimated to be at
least £425bn in 2018/19 (HMRC, 2019a).
Allowances are given for a great variety of reasons (Hills, 2015; Xu and Joyce, 2019).
The individual personal allowance, which provides an annual tax free sum to all who have
income subject to income tax is the most expensive allowance, costing £107bn. The zero
rating of food for VAT purposes, which is intended to ensure all have access to food at a
reasonable price, costs £18.6bn a year. Tax relief on the investment by business in assets,
irrespective of their social value, costs almost as much, at £18.1bn, while tax reliefs for
pensions cost at least £43.7bn pa, and another £10bn more when the tax exempt status of
pension funds is taken into account. Other tax reliefs for savings, such as those on
Individual Savings Accounts, cost £4.6bn in income tax foregone, and more when capital
gains tax is allowed for. Not taxing capital gains on people’s homes costs £27.2bn a year.
Andrew Baker and Richard Murphy
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Inheritance tax exemptions cost over £22bn and the tax only collects £5.5bn as a result. In
the circumstances the exemption of disability living allowance from tax at a cost of £1.1bn
is almost insignificant, and is dwarfed by the cost of the VAT exemption of education at
£4.1bn a year, most of the benefit of which goes to private schools.
The implication of these allowances is that the data in Table 1 is misstated. It could,
when allowances and reliefs are provided for be stated as noted in Table 2.
The actual potential tax base created by UK tax law, based on this method of
calculation, is almost £1.2trn per annum, or 56 per cent of GDP based on Office for
Budget Responsibility data (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2019: 67). However, of this
sum at least 35 per cent (and maybe more) is then forgone by government choice. This
highlights the significance of tax spends (Kay, 1986), or STEs, and also makes clear that the
costs of redistributing income and wealth, repricing market failure and reorganising the
economy (Murphy, 2015a) are already implicit within the tax system but are almost never
identified as such because the data in Table 2 is never made available by the UK
government as a basis for policy discussions (McDaniel and Surrey, 1985; Corlett, 2015).
From an MMT perspective this omission is problematic for two reasons. First, lack of
coverage of these allowances and reliefs prevents a full and proper consideration of their
social implications and their appropriateness. Such consideration would allow a greater
degree of finesse in targeting potential tax revenues for distributional objectives that
simple adjustment of rates alone cannot provide. Likewise, their effectiveness in perform-
ing the cancellation function of tax by reducing demand and sectoral inflationary
pressures is similarly obscured by the minimal oversight of STEs (Sinfield, 2012). Rather
than ignoring political economy difficulties therefore, MMT usefully highlights biases in
tax policy in terms of redistribution and inequality that simultaneously act to hamper the
utility of tax policies’ cancellation function.
A second reason emerging from an MMT framing is that many of these allowances
and reliefs exist to encourage savings. They can increase individual economic resilience
to some extent, but as MMT shows, savings are not required to fund investment. Instead
Table 1 Official Published Public Sector receipts (net of reliefs)
Tax year
2019 – 20 2018 – 19
£’bn £’bn
Income tax 193 185
National insurance contributions 142 134
Excise duties 50 49
Corporation tax 60 55
VAT 156 145
Business rates 31 30
Council tax 36 34
Other taxes 89 86
Other non-taxes 54 51
Total 811 769
Source: HM Treasury (2017a, 2018).
Monetary Theory and The Changing Role of Tax
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MMT argues that investment can always be, and usually is, funded by bank created credit.
Yet the UK tax system is designed to incentivise savings with a consequent considerable
increase in the value of those savings, as Table 3 shows: this savings wealth is very
concentrated within society (see Figure 1).
This distribution means that the bottom 10 per cent of households have total wealth of
£13,900 or less; median total household wealth is £262,400; the top 10 per cent of
households have total wealth of at least £1,224,900 and the top 1 per cent of households
have total wealth of £3,243,400 or more (ONS, 2018).
Tax heavily impacts on this distribution: as Table 3 shows in 2016, 35 per cent of all
wealth was property, with much of that family homes exempted from a charge to capital
gains tax, usually irrespective of size or value. A further 42 per cent is in pension funds,
which enjoy expensive tax subsidies. The annual cost of pension subsidies in 2017/18 (the
most recent available data) amounted to £54.7bn (HMRC, 2019c: 29). In addition, of the
net financial wealth of £1.6 trillion, more than £500 billion was represented by ISA
account balances (HMRC, 2019b: 13). In total, therefore, it is likely that 81 per cent of UK
personal wealth is held in heavily tax incentivised assets. The tax system – which
incentivises these assets at a cost of more than £86n a year – is not neutral in the
process. This analysis suggests that about 20 per cent of tax reliefs might be used in ways
that promote inequality in the UK, while serving little macroeconomic purpose from an
MMT perspective. This alone cannot, however, explain the increase in savings noted in
Table 3, which suggests that savings increased by more than £1.8trn in just two years, or
by 17 per cent.
Table 2 Tax revenues for 2018 – 19 tax year taking the cost of tax reliefs and allowances
into account
Gross notional revenues when the
cost of tax reliefs and allowances
is taken into account
Cost of tax
reliefs and
allowances
Net tax receipts
reported by the Office
for Budget
Responsibility
Tax £’bn £’bn £’bn
Income tax 336 151 185
National
insurance
contributions
221 87 134
Excise duties 49 0 49
Corporation tax 84 29 55
VAT 244 99 145
Business rates 30 0 30
Council tax 34 0 34
Other taxes 145 59 86
Other non-
taxes
51 0 51
Total 1,194 425 769
Source: HM Treasury (2018) and HMRC (2019a).
Andrew Baker and Richard Murphy
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A full explanation of that requires acknowledgement that M can be created in the
form of quantitative easing (QE). In the UK, QE has had as its goal an increase in the price
of the remaining bonds in the market, which was necessary to keep interest rates on those
bonds low (Bank of England, 2019). This process of deliberately inflating the value of
government bonds inevitably increased the financial worth of those who owned them,
effectively delivering very significant gains to a small group in society, made up of the
already wealthy4.
Four points arise from the preceding discussion. Firstly, existing tax reliefs have
fuelled an increase in wealth inequality in the UK (Rowlingson andMcKay, 2012; Bell and
Corlett, 2019; Hebden et al., 2019). Secondly, MMT sees this as misguided because it is
largely based on a premise that savings are required to fund investment. Thirdly, no other
part of the tax system is currently compensating for the resulting inequalities that these
subsidies create. Fourth, these reliefs also risk macroeconomic instability by stoking asset
inflationary pressures in particular sectors. The MMT framing, when applied in this way5,
does create a rationale for reform of the UK tax system in a fashion that places social policy
considerations centre stage, but also strengthens the intellectual case for more systematic
evaluations of STEs, using an MMT framing.
MMT’s insights on the spend-tax cycle and the resulting cancellation function, also
effectively elevate social policy criteria as the basis for evaluating tax measures’
usefulness. In the UK, reforming pension tax reliefs that cost more than £50 billion a
year and the potential removal of ISA tax reliefs are already the subject of debate (House of
Commons, 2018). Other potential measures include ending inheritance reliefs for agri-
cultural property, because they can inflate land values, while ensuring the continuity of
land ownership by absentee landlords. As the data discussed earlier revealed, reliefs that
treat investment, savings and inheritance income favourably in the UK have increased
savings and accumulated assets, but have also exacerbated income and wealth inequality.
From an MMT perspective, tax reliefs that encourage and preserve pools of capital in this
way also potentially undermine the cancellation function of taxation, while risking asset
inflation.
Table 3 Breakdown of aggregate total wealth, by components Great Britain, July 2012 to
June 2016
£ billion
July 2012 to
June 2014
July 2014 to
June 2016
Percentage
Change
Property Wealth (net) 3,806 4,516 19
Financial Wealth (net) 1,564 1,630 4
Physical Wealth 1,130 1,230 9
Private Pension Wealth 4,385 5,354 22
Total Wealth (including Private
Pension Wealth)
10,886 12,730 17
Total Wealth (excluding Private
Pension Wealth)
6,500 7,376 13
Source: ONS (2018).
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A forthcoming modified proposal from the UK Green New Deal Group suggests that
ISA and pension reliefs, rather than being abolished altogether, could have attached to
them a condition that funds saved through these mechanisms be invested in activity
intended to tackle climate crisis. In this creative way, tax reliefs can be restructured and
placed at the wider service of re-ordering the financial system towards mitigating climate
change. In the United States, similar tax proposals have been developed under the Green
New Deal proposals of Senator Bernie Sanders. They include increasing taxes on the fossil
fuel industry to reduce production levels. Simultaneous investments in 20 million new
jobs to help with infrastructure and energy transitions would in turn be partially cancelled
by the fossil fuel industry tax and extra income tax generated by new jobs. A new
proposed ‘work opportunity tax credit’ for employers who employ workers displaced by
the energy transition would constitute a relief simultaneously encouraging employment
and reduced fossil fuel use.
These examples illustrate how anMMT framing can inform the re-design of systems of
tax reliefs on a more systematic basis so as to more effectively serve important social
policy priorities. One tool that would support such a shift and provide social policy
scholars with an additional source of data is tax spillover assessment (Baker and Murphy,
2019a). A tax spillover is the impact one aspect of tax policy has on the available tax base
within the same state, or other states (IFS, 2011; Nanda and Parkes, 2019). As well as
discouraging states from pursuing policies that can be shown to harm the tax bases of other
states, spillover assessments consider the relationships between different features of the
same tax system and ask whether they reinforce or undermine those elements (domestic
spillovers). In MMT terms, this enables a fuller picture to be drawn of whether particular
policies within a tax system undermine the withdrawal function of the tax system in its
entirety. At the same time, such assessments help to illuminate whether certain current tax
practices have an implicit and often hidden social policy bias.
Applying a spillover assessment tool kit in a full UK assessment, revealed that both
capital gains and corporation tax provisions encouraged the shifting of income out of the
income tax base (Baker and Murphy, 2019b: 5). At the same time, a whole range of
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exemptions, allowances and reliefs were found to provide favour to income earned from
wealth rather than from work, further incentivising the under reporting of income (Baker
and Murphy, 2019b: 4). A recommendation emerging from that assessment was that all
allowances and reliefs offered in the UK should be systematically evaluated to determine:
their cost; their economic effectiveness; the benefits arising from continuing to offer them;
and any impact of their withdrawal. The need for systematic evaluations of STEs has been
identified by the social policy literature (Sinfield, 2012; Morel et al., 2018), but locating
such evaluations within an MMT framing would enable them to serve a dual macroeco-
nomic and social policy function, leading to more accurate assessments of a tax regime’s
capacity to fulfil its cancellation function.
Conc lus ions : tax re forms sugges ted by modern moneta ry theory and
sp i l love r ana l ys i s
In this article, we have sought to show that an MMT framing strengthens arguments for tax
reform that would simultaneously be more effective in maintaining the non-inflationary
macroeconomic integrity of the spend-tax cycle, while achieving social policy objectives
of employment creation, encouraging a green energy transition, and reducing inequality.
A crucial, but often neglected, question in designing the configuration of tax policies and
practices is whether those practices reinforce, or undermine, parts of the same tax system,
or administration (Baker andMurphy, 2019a). Using MMT insights on money creation and
the resulting spend-investment/tax cycle, we have illustrated how certain tax reliefs
incentivise savings. From a macroeconomic perspective, that is not only questionable
but can also spill over to undermine other parts of the same tax system, while producing an
expansion in wealth inequality. An MMT framing when harnessed with a direct applica-
tion of spillover analysis to the UK demonstrates that this is a double ill from both a
macroeconomic and social policy perspective (Baker and Murphy, 2019a, 2019b).
The analytical steps taken in this contribution point to a potential tax reform agenda,
which would achieve useful macroeconomic and social policy objectives. The thumbnail
sketch we have provided is intended to provoke others to further consider how tax reforms
can serve a dual macroeconomic and social policy purpose. For example, taxing capital
gains at the same rates as in the 1980s and similar moves to restore corporation tax to pre-
2010 levels would discourage the diversion of income into company structures, which
undermines both income tax, and potentially the cancellation or withdrawal function of
the tax system as a whole. Generous capital gains tax allowances on buy-to-let properties,
that potentially fuel asset inflation and reduce access to affordable homes, could be
substantially reduced. The proceeds from reduced allowances could then be invested in
social housing. The fact that national insurance charges in the UK apply only to income
from work, but not investment income, also make it a potential target for reform based on
the application of similar MMT logics. At present, those who work for a living pay
considerably more tax on identical levels of income than those who receive income as a
return on investments of a variety of forms. When the saving process is not required to
drive investment, the socially regressive nature of such policies becomes much clearer.
Harnessing the insights of MMT to new governance tools, such as tax spillover
assessments, can therefore help to show how tax can be used and designed to perform
important creative social policy functions, and at the same time be made more effective in
macroeconomic terms. The proposals we highlight here are a mere pointer, but they are
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indicative of the kind of tax reform agenda that the application of an MMT lens and its
mind-set shift can generate. Re-engineering tax systems to serve social policy objectives in
the light of these insights is an interdisciplinary undertaking. Social policy researchers can
and should be at the forefront of informing such an undertaking, but they can be aided by
an engagement with, and a fuller elaboration of, the MMT perspective on tax.
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Notes
1 This relates to the practical mechanics of how government spending actually occurs. Governments
spend by crediting the accounts of those entities they are investing in thereby creating newmoney. From the
MMT perspective this activity has to precede government reclaiming (‘cancelling’) that money through
taxation.
2 Dollarisation in some developing countries is a rather different case.
3 The question of the limits to this is not something we consider here, though it does not
fundamentally undermine the sequential case we present here.
4 From an MMT perspective QE could fund a Universal Basic Income (UBI) (Standing, 2017), or full
employment through a Job Guarantee (Mitchell et al., 2019: 295). Both are examples of monetary financed
fiscal policy serving social policy objectives to mitigate inequality.
5 To the best of our knowledge it has not been to date.
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